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International trade and the distribution of economy-wide 
benefits from the disbursement of climate finance 
Abstract 
In the framework of recent international climate negotiations, industrialised countries 
have committed to transfer at least USD 100 billion per year to developing countries 
from 2020. Climate finance has become the subject of an already extensive literature. 
However, the economic impact of the disbursement of climate finance and the role of 
international trade in its distribution globally have not been studied yet. This paper 
specifically estimates the geographical distribution of economic benefits for 17 
mitigation and 9 adaptation options. We use a Global Multi-Regional Input-Output 
framework to track both domestic as well as spill-over effects of climate finance 
disbursements. The relevance of spill-overs is confirmed: on average, 29% of the 
economic benefits of climate actions flow to countries different from the recipient 
country (i.e. to the donors and third countries). But this percentage varies widely, 
between 11 and 61 % depending on the type of climate action implemented as well as 
the recipient country. The findings are expected to be of interest for both recipient and 
donor countries as they provide guidance on how to maximize the economic co-benefits 
of climate finance. 
Keywords: climate finance, international trade, GMRIO, development 
1. Introduction
Financial resources are needed for both climate change mitigation and adaptation. 
Large-scale investments are required to significantly reduce emissions, notably in 
sectors that emit large quantities of greenhouse gases (GHGs). The International Energy 
Agency estimates that achieving a low-carbon energy sector will require an average of 
United States dollar (USD) 1.2 trillion in additional investments annually up to 2050 
(IEA, 2014). On the other hand, according to the Adaptation Gap Report (UNEP, 2014), 
the global cost of adaptation is currently estimated to range between USD 70 billion and 
more than 100 billion per year by 2050. However, the dispersion and heterogeneity of 
adaptation measures make cost estimates very uncertain and probably biased 
downwards. 
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Most developing countries face financial constraints (public as well as private), 
and significant additional costs imposed on their development by the impacts of climate 
change. Therefore, bilateral/multilateral public and private financing are all likely to be 
important sources of funding for their mitigation and adaptation activities. Climate 
finance is a critical topic in the United Nations’ climate talks and industrialised 
countries have committed to provide assistance to developing countries at the 
Copenhagen Accord, and in the Cancun and Paris Agreements of the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC, 2009, 2010, 2015). In these 
international agreements the higher-income countries have jointly pledged up to USD 
30 billion in Fast Start Finance (FSF) for lower-income countries in the period 2010-
2012 and, in terms of long-term finance, USD 100 billion annually from 2020 onwards 
(and a larger amount, still to be determined, after 2025).  
Some governments have started to mobilize financial resources to support 
developing countries’ mitigation and adaptation actions. The commitment for the FSF 
period was reached, especially due to the contributions by Germany, Japan, Norway, the 
United Kingdom (UK) and the United States of America (USA) (Gupta et al., 2014). 
However, developed countries are far from reaching the long-term finance goal of USD 
100 billion per year. According to OECD/CPI estimates, developed countries were able 
to mobilize and transfer USD 57 billion on average in 2013-2014 (OECD & CPI, 2015). 
This estimate does not include the initial capitalisation of the Green Climate Fund 
(GCF), which accounts for USD 10.3 billion as of December 2016 (GCF, 2016). In 
September 2016, the five main contributors to climate funds (including the GCF) were 
UK (USD 11,228 million), Norway (USD 6,606 million), USA (USD 5,750 million), 
Germany (USD 4,203 million), and Japan (USD 3,208 million)1. Experts agree that 
climate finance must be accelerated and scaled up to put the world on track to attain 
climate-neutral and resilient development in this century (Gupta et al., 2014).  
So far, mitigation projects have accumulated the largest share of climate 
finance flowing from developed to developing countries. This bias towards mitigation 
was already detected in the FSF period, when mitigation was receiving 72% of 
contributions (Nakhooda, Fransen, Kuramochi, & Caravani, 2013). According to the 
OECD estimates of the 2013-2014 flows, the thematic distribution of these transfers has 
been 77% to mitigation, 16% to adaptation and 7% to cross-cutting actions (OECD & 
CPI, 2015). Buchner, Trabacchi, Mazza, Abramskiehn, & Wang (2015), accounting not 
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only for internationally provided funding but also for domestically mobilized resources, 
found a strong bias towards mitigation in 2014, particularly towards renewable energy. 
Adaptation projects seem to have more difficulties in attracting funding than mitigation 
projects. Exceptions are East Asia (EA) and the Pacific and Sub-Saharan Africa where 
56% of total climate finance is for adaptation, especially for measures in the water- and 
wastewater sector (ibid). 
A rapidly growing body of literature on climate finance is emerging, including 
the study of the drivers of international transfers. Authors addressing this question from 
a theoretical perspective have identified different causes for the current bias towards the 
financing of mitigation over adaptation. These causes include the “global public good” 
nature of mitigation in contrast to the local scope of adaptation, the cheap mitigation 
opportunities in developing countries, the existence of established business models and 
carbon markets, and the possibility to reduce future adaptation needs with investments 
in mitigation (Abadie, Galarraga, & Rübbelke, 2013; Pickering & Rübbelke, 2014; 
Pittel & Rübbelke, 2013; Rübbelke, 2011). Empirical analysis highlights the relevance 
of country-specific factors, like their institutional, economic and political characteristics 
(Halimanjaya, 2015; Pickering et al., 2015). 
This paper contributes to this body of literature by studying an aspect of 
climate finance that, to the best of our knowledge, has not been considered yet: the 
economic effects of expenditures driven by climate actions, taking into account the role 
of international trade. It is obvious that mitigation and adaptation actions linked to 
climate finance have economic impacts in terms of avoided costs of climate change. In 
addition, in some cases, these actions can have co-benefits in terms, for example, of 
health improvements due to the reduction of air pollution. However, these are not the 
only economic implications of climate finance. Like any other type of expenditure, 
projects and programmes aimed at reducing emissions and/or enhancing climate-
resilience require the production of goods and services, and hence, the creation of value-
added in various economic sectors at different locations. This paper quantifies the extent 
to which the benefits of climate action, in terms of value-added creation, are retained by 
recipient countries of climate finance or, by contrast, are captured by companies from 
other countries via international trade. Moreover, by assessing the economic effects of 
different types of climate actions in different locations, this paper provides information 
for climate finance allocation decisions. Note that the scope of the assessment of 
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economic effects is limited to the phase of disbursement of climate finance. Another 
branch of the climate finance literature deals with the economic consequences of the 
mobilization of financial resources in donor countries (Basu, Finneran, Bishop, & 
Sundararaman, 2011; IMF, 2011; Jones, Keen, & Strand, 2013; Parker et al., 2010). We 
also keep out of the analysis the study of the effectiveness of climate finance in terms of 
avoided costs of future climate change. 
The specific objectives of this paper can be summarized in three questions. 
First, how are the economic impacts of climate actions distributed between countries? 
Second, distinguishing for different types of mitigation and adaptation actions, how 
much of the impact spills over to non-recipient countries? And third, distinguishing for 
different disbursement options (i.e. combinations of recipient country and climate 
action), how much impact is captured by each donor country?  
The article is divided into five sections. After this introduction (Section 1), the 
methods and materials are introduced in Section 2. Results are presented in Section 3, 
and discussed in Section 4. Section 5 presents conclusions and policy implications. 
2. Methods and materials 
2.1. The Input-Output Model 
The Input-Output (IO) approach has been widely applied to various areas over the last 
50 years (Han, Yoo, & Kwak, 2004; Miller & Blair, 2009). This is the most widely 
utilized approach for the analysis of macro-economic effects of major new expenditures, 
as is the case for investments driven by climate policies (e.g. Allan et al., 2008; Caldés, 
Varela, Santamaría, & Sáez, 2009; Hienuki, Kudoh, & Hondo, 2015; Markaki, Belegri-
Roboli, Michaelides, Mirasgedis, & Lalas, 2013; Neuwahl, Löschel, Mongelli, & 
Delgado, 2008; Oliveira, Coelho, da Silva, & Antunes, 2013; Scott, Roop, Schultz, 
Anderson, & Cort, 2008; Tourkolias & Mirasgedis, 2011).  
An IO table provides a picture of the market transactions taking place between 
the different actors (producers, households, government, etc.) of one economic system 
in a specific year. National IO tables, representing the national economic system, are 
appropriate for the assessment of domestic effects of new investments, but do not 
capture the impact in other countries (Herreras Martínez et al., 2013; Ziegelmann, 
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Mohr, & Unger, 2000). These effects, also called spill-over effects, refer to economic 
impacts outside of the economy where the expenditure is made, and are driven by 
international trade.  
Given the growth of vertical specialization and the increasingly global nature 
of current supply chains (Francois, Manchin, & Tomberger, 2015; Johnson & Noguera, 
2012; Koopman, Wang, & Wei, 2012, 2014; Los, Timmer, & de Vries, 2015; 
Nagengast & Stehrer, 2016)2, Global Multiregional Input-Output (GMRIO) tables are a 
highly suitable tool for studies with a global scope, since they inherently reflect the 
current interconnectivity of the world’s economies. They comprise information on 
global supply chains, reflecting the participation of the different sectors and countries in 
the production process of each single good or service. The information about inter-
linkages between industries makes it possible to comprehensively track the effect of an 
exogenous increase in demand throughout the global productive system. GMRIO tables 
allow us to trace the value-added created by all the labour and capital directly or 
indirectly needed for the production of final goods along their global value chains. This 
feature makes this framework suitable for the purpose of this paper (M. P. Timmer, 
Erumban, Los, Stehrer, & de Vries, 2014). Spill-over effects of climate policy have 
been previously assessed using this framework at the European Union (EU) level (Arto, 
Amores, & Rueda-Cantuche, 2015; Markandya, Arto, González-Eguino, & Román, 
2016). In the Appendix we show the formal structure of the multiregional IO model and 
how we have used it to analyze the effects of climate finance. 
The IO method is based on the assumption of a linear relationship between 
inputs and production. It is also assumed that each sector produces one product, and that 
each sector has a single and constant input structure. The model ignores the possibility 
of substitution between inputs or the possibility of increasing/decreasing returns to scale 
and technical change. A change in output is supposed to produce a proportional change 
in inputs without affecting prices. These assumptions are only reasonable in the medium 
term (since the change in the economic structure can be assumed to occur relatively 
slowly), and in economies with excess capacity and involuntary unemployment, or for 
the study of relatively small interventions that will not affect prices (Ciorba, Pauli, & 
Menna, 2004; Tourkolias & Mirasgedis, 2011). These requisites are met in our case, 
since the focus is on short-term effects of expenditures that, due to their limited volume, 
cannot be expected to put pressure on wages and prices. Note that, in order to avoid 
Page 5 of 42
URL: https://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/cdev  Email: TCLD-peerreview@journals.tandf.co.uk
Submission to Climate and Development
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Review Only
arbitrary assumptions, the analysis is limited to the gross effects, ignoring the effect of 
expenditures potentially displaced by the climate finance disbursements. The 
assessment of net effects free of assumptions is possible using a retrospective approach 
when historical data on the actual transformations of the economy is available (as 
shown by Markandya et al., 2016). 
2.2. The database 
In order to apply this model two sets of data are required: 1) the GMRIO database, that 
provides information at industry level on production, technical coefficients, final 
demand and value-added for different countries; and 2) the data required to define the 
demand shock (
'
f
st
 in the model, see the Appendix) per climate action and recipient 
country.  
From the various GMRIO databases (see Tukker & Dietzenbacher, 2013), the 
World Input-Output Database (WIOD) is chosen. Two important advantages of WIOD 
are the following: first, it is public and freely available; and, second, it is based on 
national Supply and Use Tables (SUT), which contain information in terms of 
commodities that is required for the definition of the demand shocks. World Input-
Output Tables (WIOT) from the WIOD combine information on national production 
activities for 59 products and 35 industries with international trade data for 40 countries 
(27 EU countries3 and 13 other major countries) for the period 1995-2011 (see Timmer 
et al. (2012) for further information on the database). The WIOD has certain 
weaknesses related to measurement issues
4
 and an important limitation for our analysis: 
the absence of least developed countries, where climate finance disbursements are most 
needed.  
The analysis focuses on the most recent data (i.e. year 2011) and on all the 
countries included in the WIOD. Brazil, China, Indonesia, India and Mexico are 
considered climate finance recipient countries, and the rest of countries are considered 
donor countries. Donors are divided into four groups: USA, EU, EA (Japan, Korea and 
Taiwan) and other developed countries (ODC: Australia, Canada, Russia and Turkey). 
While this set does not include all countries, it represented approximately 84% of global 
GDP and 72% of global GHG emissions in 2011. The set of recipient countries 
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represents around 60% of the emissions as well as GDP from developing countries in 
2011 (World Bank Indicators). 
Demand shocks are calculated for different types of climate actions using 
different sources of information. Following previous categorizations of climate action 
measures (Blazejczak, Braun, Edler, & Schill, 2014; Buchner et al., 2013; OECD/IEA, 
2014; Prowse & Snilstveit, 2010; REN21, 2014, p. 21; UNFCCC, 2014b), 26 climate 
actions are considered, divided into three groups:  
- Mitigation: This group consist of those actions with benefits in terms of GHG 
emissions reductions, including 14 renewable energy technologies (biogas 
power; biomass energy at large scale; biomass energy at small scale; 
concentrated solar power (CSP); deep geothermal energy; surface geothermal 
energy; hydropower; ocean power; offshore wind power; onshore wind power; 
photovoltaics; renewable energy in buildings; renewable energy in transport; 
solar thermal energy) and three energy efficiency measures (building insulation; 
energy efficiency in industry; transport infrastructures);  
- Adaptation: This group consist of those actions that improve the resilience of 
societies, including measures in six sectors (coastal protection; disaster risk 
reduction; human settlements, infrastructure and spatial planning; social 
protection; waste and wastewater; water supply and management).  
- Mitigation and adaptation (M&A): This group contains three actions with 
benefits in both aspects (agriculture, fishing and livestock; capacity building; 
forestry and land use, terrestrial ecosystems).  
For each climate action, a particular cost structure has to be determined. Cost 
structures consist of the distribution of the total costs of implementation of one action 
amongst the IO industries or commodities. Cost structures have to be defined in terms 
of the commodities classification of the SUT of WIOD (i.e. the Statistical Classification 
of Economic Activities in the European Community or NACE5). The cost structures of 
mitigation actions are taken from the literature: most renewable energy technologies 
from Lehr, Nitsch, Kratzat, Lutz, & Edler (2008) and Lehr, Lutz, & Edler (2012); ocean 
energy from Allan et al. (2008); renewable energy in transport and buildings and energy 
efficiency measures from Markaki et al. (2013). Detailed information at project level of 
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National Adaptation Programmes of Action (NAPA) (UNFCCC, 2014b) is used for the 
definition of the cost structures of the rest of the climate actions. Since each climate 
action in adaptation comprises very different types of interventions, one particular 
NAPA project has been selected for each type, as shown in Table 1. The cost structure 
of each climate action is calculated as the average of the cost structures of the different 
types of interventions it comprises. The allocation of expenditures contained in NAPA 
projects to the commodity categories of the SUT is done following the correspondence 
in Table 2. 
Figure 1 shows the obtained cost structures in terms of commodities, showing 
clearly the differences between the types of climate action envisaged. It shows, for 
example, that almost any type of project requires some construction work (commodity 
code 45), machinery (commodity code 29) and other business services (commodity 
code 74). On the contrary, only few actions, such as introducing biofuels in transport, 
require agricultural products (commodity code 1). 
There is uncertainty regarding the cost structures defined for each climate 
action. The cost structure of renewable energy technologies depends on where and when 
the data on costs was gathered, due to differences in the costs of raw materials and 
labour, the different levels of commercial maturity of technologies, the evolution of 
global markets, etc. Adaptation projects or programs are very heterogeneous, and the 
site-specific circumstances influence costs. The approach proposed here can be used to 
undertake concrete case studies departing from data of particular projects, something 
that would enhance the accuracy of results. However, the ambition of this paper is to 
extract general conclusions about the sharing of economic benefits of climate finance 
that are not evident at first glance.  
Obtained cost structures are based on cost data that include taxes and trade 
margins. Since the WIOT are expressed at basic prices (i.e. the amount actually received 
by producers), trade and transport margins and taxes need to be reallocated. WIOD 
International Supply Tables contain the information required to calculate tax and 
margins rates for each recipient country6 and commodity. The part of the expenditure 
corresponding to taxes is reallocated according to the government expenditure structure 
in each recipient country, which is calculated with information from the WIOD 
International Use Tables. The amount corresponding to trade margins (calculated with 
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margins rates and the expenditure net of taxes) is reallocated according to the share of 
the total margins corresponding to each trade and transport service in each recipient 
country, which is calculated with information from the WIOD International Supply 
Tables. 
Once the cost structures are expressed in basic prices, the next step is to 
differentiate where commodities are produced. Using the WIOD International Use 
Tables, the portion of the total demand that is produced domestically, along with the 
portion that is imported from all the other countries, are calculated for each recipient 
country and each commodity. Finally, the demands of each commodity and country are 
allocated to the WIOT industries according to market shares calculated with the 
information of the International Supply Tables. The resulting demand shocks (
'f st ) 
contain additional final demands, at basic prices, to different sectors (in different 
countries) that each climate action entails in each recipient country.  
3. Results 
Using this multiregional framework the amount of value-added generated by each 
country contributing (directly or indirectly) to the production of the goods and services 
needed for the climate actions is obtained. In this section, the research questions listed 
in the introduction are answered. Since impacts at the sector level are not the focus of 
this research, results are aggregated at country level. 
3.1. Geographic distribution of the value-added impact 
The first question is how the economic impacts caused by the implementation of climate 
actions are distributed between countries. Figure 2 displays the geographic distribution 
of the value-added impact of the 26 climate actions considered, depending on where 
climate finance is disbursed. For example, looking at the results for India, it can be seen 
that out of every USD 100 spent in climate actions in India, USD 80 remain in the 
Indian economy, China and the EU capture four USD each, the USA and ODC capture 
two USD each, EA countries capture one USD and the remaining seven USD go to the 
rest of the world (ROW). 
On the one hand, the figure shows the differences in the ability of the 
economies of recipient countries to hold on to the value-added: in India and Brazil 
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around 80% of the benefit remains within the domestic economy, but Mexico and 
Indonesia retain no more than two thirds. China is in an intermediate position among 
recipient countries, retaining 72% of the impact of its climate actions. On average, spill-
overs account for 28.6% of the total impact.  
On the other hand, the ability of countries to attract spill-over effects also 
varies. The EU is the region that benefits most from international spill-overs in most 
cases. It captures 9% of the impacts generated when climate actions are implemented in 
China and 7% in the cases of Brazil, Indonesia and Mexico. It is also the donor that 
captures the highest share of spill-overs from India, where these are in any case very 
low for all donors. Note that the USA captures 15% of the impacts when climate actions 
are implemented in Mexico, but less than 3% from other recipient countries. EA 
captures 6% of the impacts generated by climate actions in China and 5% in the case of 
Indonesia. In fact, EA captures more spill-overs than the USA in these two countries. 
China also substantially benefits from spill-overs independently of the destination of 
climate finance. Spill-overs attracted by China are among the largest when climate 
finance goes to India, Brazil and Indonesia. For example, China attracts more spill-
overs from India and Indonesia than the USA does, and a similar level of spill-overs 
from Brazil.  
In order to clarify how impacts generated by climate finance are distributed 
among countries, consider the following example, illustrated in Figure 3: if each of the 
four donor countries (or group of countries) transferred one USD to a hypothetical GCF 
and this four USD fund was equally distributed among the five recipient countries, each 
of the donors would recover the following amounts in the form of spill-overs: USD 0.27 
for the EU, USD 0.21 for the USA, USD 0.15 for EA and USD 0.08 for ODC. The 
amounts obtained by recipient countries would be USD 0.72 for China, USD 0.65 for 
India, USD 0.64 for Brazil, USD 0.53 for Indonesia and USD 0.49 for Mexico. 
Figure 4 summarises the distribution of the value-added impacts of this 
hypothetical climate finance architecture. This example clearly shows that international 
trade redirects the value-added impacts from recipient countries to the countries that 
produce the inputs required for the deployment of climate actions. 
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3.2. Spill-overs by type of climate action 
So far, average impacts across a wide range of climate actions have been 
presented. But the geographical distribution of value-added is different for each type of 
climate action: some produce mainly domestic impacts whereas others generate a large 
proportion of spill-overs. Figure 5 shows the spill-overs associated with each type of 
investment on average for the considered recipient countries. 
For example, out of every USD 100 spent in ocean power plants, USD 45 (on 
average for our set of recipient countries) go to countries different from the host 
country. Spill-overs range from 17% to 45%. Several actions related to renewable 
energy sources (ocean power, solar thermal power, onshore wind, geothermal surface, 
hydropower and the introduction of renewable energy in buildings) produce spill-overs 
in excess of 35%. The spill-overs from other renewable energy technologies 
(photovoltaics, small biomass, biogas and offshore wind), energy efficiency measures in 
industry, construction of infrastructures for transport and adaptation, disaster risk 
reduction actions and adaptation measures in the water sector range from 30% to 35%. 
The spill-overs from some renewable energy technologies (CSP, large biomass, deep 
geothermal and biofuels), adaptation measures (waste management and social 
protection) and M&A actions (agriculture and capacity building) range from 20% to 
30%. Finally, spill-overs of less than 20% are generated in the forestry sector, insulation 
of buildings and protection of coasts. 
Table 3 presents for each type of action the portion of the impact that occurs in 
each country7. Figures for recipient countries reflect the percentage of impact that each 
one holds on to from domestic climate actions. For example, out of every USD 100 
spent in capacity building projects in China, USD 78 remain in the Chinese economy. 
Figures for donor countries reflect the percentage of impact that each donor country 
attracts on average from the recipient countries considered. For example, the USA 
captures on average four USD out of every USD 100 spent in adaptation of the 
agriculture sector of the considered recipient countries. The figures do not add up to 
100%, since spill-overs captured by countries other than donors are not included. Recall 
that a significant share of the impact of climate actions in different recipient countries 
ends up in China, a fact that is not reflected in Table 3. 
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This table clearly illustrates that measures with larger impacts on the 
economies of recipients offer limited benefits for donor countries in terms of spill-over 
effects. Depending on the type of action, the average domestic share of the impact 
ranges from 57% to 84% (see column 6 in Table 3). Differences exist depending on the 
regions where actions are implemented. Brazil and India retain between 68% and 89% 
of the relevant impacts, while Mexico holds on to between 39% and 83%, depending on 
the type of action. 
Average figures are included for broader categories of climate action (last four 
rows in Table 3). Depending on the recipient country, the domestic share of the impact 
of M&A actions is between 76% and 86%. Other adaptation measures and energy 
efficiency actions enable countries to hold on to between 64% and 82% of the impacts. 
Deployment of renewable energy sources of energy retains only between 53% and 77% 
of the impacts.  
According to our results, the climate actions with the highest impact for 
recipient countries are the following: forestry sector and capacity building actions in the 
case of M&A; coastal protection, social protection and waste management actions in the 
case of adaptation; building insulation in the case of energy efficiency; and the use of 
biofuels, deep geothermal, large biomass and CSP generation in the case of renewable 
energy. 
Depending on the type of action, the average spill-overs that accrue to donor 
countries range from 2% to 7%, with substantial differences between donors (last 
column in Table 3). Hence, depending on the donor country, renewable energy 
investments may provide spill-overs of between 2% and 8%, energy efficiency 
measures and adaptation between 2% and 7% and M&A actions between 1% and 5% 
(last four rows in Table 3). From the point of view of donor countries, the types of 
climate actions that result in a significant portion of impacts taking place in their 
economies are the following ones: ocean, wind, solar and hydropower for renewable 
energy sources; those in the industry sector and transport infrastructures for energy 
efficiency projects; actions in the water sector, infrastructures and disaster risk reduction 
measures for adaptation; and actions in the agriculture sector for M&A.  
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Although there is a common pattern for all countries included on the same side 
of the climate finance transfer (i.e. recipients or donors) regarding the effects of each 
type of action, there are slight variations. For example, India experiences a larger impact 
than the average recipient country due to the introduction of biofuels and water supply 
and management investments. China also stands out because of the size of the local 
impact of biofuels and photovoltaics. The same occurs with donors. For instance the EU 
stands out because of the size of the spill-overs received from ocean power investments. 
3.3. Spill-overs by donor country and disbursement option 
In the previous section, spill-overs by donor country, given as average, did not enable to 
distinguish differences caused by the location where actions are implemented. The size 
of spill-overs captured by a donor country depends not only on the type of climate 
action, but also on the recipient country where it is undertaken. Table 4 gathers the 
results relative to the portion of spill-overs that each donor country can expect from 
climate-related expenditures in the different recipient countries8. To rank climate 
finance disbursement alternatives according to potential of value-added spill-overs, this 
table could help to identify the best options for each donor country.  
The USA benefits especially from climate projects in Mexico, regardless of 
their type, as it captures between 7% (coastal protection) and 24% (ocean energy) of the 
total impact in the form of spill-overs. Other investment options that offer good returns 
to the USA are ocean energy projects in Brazil and Indonesia and onshore wind projects 
in Brazil (5% each). China is the country that generates the largest spill-overs for the 
EU and ODC. The action that offers the largest spill-overs for the EU is ocean power in 
China and in Mexico (13%). Indonesia, Mexico and Brazil offer spill-overs of 7% on 
average for the EU. ODC’s best options are small biomass projects in China (5%), 
ocean power and onshore wind in Mexico (4%) and ocean power in Indonesia (4%). EA 
benefits especially from ocean energy and surface geothermal investments in Indonesia 
(11%), but also from several types of projects in China and Mexico (7%).  
Several combinations of location/type of action have a very limited potential to 
generate spill-overs for donors. Cases with average spill-overs below 2% include most 
climate actions in India, several in Brazil (social protection, renewable energy in 
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transport, capacity building and forest adaptation, building insulation and coastal 
protection), and building insulation and coastal protection in Indonesia. 
4. Discussion 
Results show that the stimulus generated by climate-related expenditures is shared out 
between the recipient country and other economies, including donor countries, due to 
international trade. This fact may have implications for both donors and recipients when 
making decisions about climate finance allocation.  
From the point of view of a potential donor, as long as its ability to capture 
spill-overs is substantial, contributing to climate finance might be a way to stimulate 
exports and growth. Since the size of potential benefits differs from one donor to 
another, as results on spill-overs show, the influence of this factor on climate finance 
decisions might also vary.  
Despite that spill-overs might currently be only receiving marginal attention 
from the donors, it is remarkable that those donors benefitting from significant spill-
overs are also major contributors to climate funds (i.e. UK, USA, Germany and Japan). 
The great ability of China to capture spill-overs may also be somehow related to the 
prominence of China as donor in South-South cooperation. In fact, China does not hide 
the fact that foreign aid is seen as a way to expand exports (Minas, 2014; The Climate 
Group, 2013).  
Our results indicate the potential of each type of action and alternative location 
for generating spill-over effects via demand for donors’ industries products. The group 
of measures that produce the largest spill-overs includes several mitigation and 
adaptation options requiring goods with high technology content that are not usually 
produced domestically in many recipient countries, such as machinery (commodity code 
29), electrical, communication and precision equipment (commodities code 31-33) and 
motor vehicles (commodity code 34).  
So far, investments in the energy sector have been a priority in the use of 
climate finance (UNFCCC, 2014a). According to our results, this may have produced 
substantial spill-overs for donors. Agriculture and water, the main sectors receiving 
finance for adaptation, are also associated with the generation of substantial spill-overs 
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due to the requirements of machinery (commodity code 29) and research and 
development services (commodity code 73) (see Figure 1). Asia and the Pacific region 
(including two recipients that generate large spill-overs, such as China and Indonesia) 
are the main recipients of past climate finance. This would suggest that the search for 
spill-overs has been one of the factors determining the international allocation of 
climate finance. However, a significant proportion of funds has been used for mitigation 
in the forestry sector in Latin America, a fact that would not be consistent with the 
prospects of spill-over effects. 
On the other hand, projects that are most able to stimulate recipient countries’ 
economies are those intensive in locally produced services like construction work 
(commodity code 45) and other business services (commodity code 74), as is the case 
for many adaptation options. Allocating the same priority to support for adaptation as to 
mitigation has recently become a core element rather than a peripheral issue in the 
United Nations’ climate talks, especially due to developing countries’ demands (Fridahl 
& Linnér, 2015; Galarraga & Román, 2013, 2015; GCF, 2014). This position in favour 
of increased support for adaptation by developing countries would make sense from the 
perspective of trying to increase the local impact of climate finance disbursements. 
To sum up, the donor’s bias towards funding renewable energy projects and the 
developing countries’ demand for more funding for adaptation would be consistent with 
the economic interests of each group of countries’, in the light of our results. Results 
also provide insights about an additional aspect that should be borne in mind when 
assessing alternative investment options from the point of view of both donors and 
recipients.  
Our results reinforce the idea that the impacts of climate finance are best 
assessed on a global scale, and demonstrate the potential of GMRIO databases as tools 
for analysing economy-wide impacts of climate finance. However, the already 
mentioned shortcomings of the IO method apply here too. Recall also that our 
assessment only considers the positive short-term effects associated with new 
expenditures, but does not account for other impacts on the medium/long term 
associated with potential displaced expenditures, changes in prices or income. 
Furthermore, we only explore the “ancillary” economic impacts of climate finance, in 
the sense that we do not account for the direct economic benefits of mitigation and 
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adaptations in terms of avoided impacts (which is the ultimate objective of climate 
finance). 
There are several ways to extend the present research: first, by broadening the 
scope of analysis to include additional countries. Our analysis only considers five major 
recipient countries. This might lead to an underestimation of the size of spill-over 
effects, since it has already been argued that small countries generate more spill-overs 
(see, for example, Dietzenbacher, Guilhoto, et al., 2013).  
This connects with a second possible extension of our research: identifying 
factors that can explain the results. Despite the fact that all recipient countries 
considered are big economies, Table 3 shows differences in the abilities of these 
countries to retain the impacts of similar types of investment. Apart from size, 
Dietzenbacher et al. (2013) point to the openness of economies to explain the size of 
spill-overs. The small spill-overs generated by Brazil could thus be a consequence of 
the big size of its economy and the low dependency on imports (a result that the said 
authors corroborate in the paper cited). Beutel (2003) points to two additional factors: 
development level and competitiveness. In fact, competitiveness might provide an 
explanation of results for Mexico: despite the big size of the Mexican economy, its 
weaker competitive position in relation to the USA economy could explain the size of 
the spill-overs between the two countries. Competitiveness might also help us 
understand why EU countries and the USA, among the donors, and China, among the 
recipients, are where most relevant spill-overs occur9. Other factors that could be 
included in the study of the determinants of the magnitude of spill-overs are the 
productive specialization and geographical location. 
As previously explained, value-added includes labour remuneration and capital 
compensation. Thus, one part of the impact accrues to workers and the rest to owners of 
capital. According to Timmer et al. (2014) from 1995 to 2008 the capital share of value-
added has increased globally, but especially in emerging countries such as China, India, 
Brazil and Mexico. Given the sizeable foreign investment flows, it can be imagined that 
a significant part of the domestic impact of climate actions in emerging regions is in the 
form of revenues of multinational companies, whose headquarters are in the most 
economically advanced regions. Our results do not enable to observe these kind of spill-
overs. So, a third possible extension of this paper would consist of separating labour and 
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capital impacts, and within the latter differentiate the part corresponding to foreign 
capital. 
5. Conclusions 
Studies assessing the economic impacts of climate-related expenditures at the national 
level have noted the relevant role of international trade. For instance, Lehr et al. (2008) 
conclude that if low-carbon technologies create employment in Germany, this is due to 
exports. Other studies also show that the ability to retain economic gains depends on the 
share of components that can be manufactured domestically (Ciorba et al., 2004; 
Markaki et al., 2013; Oliveira et al., 2013). These previous findings point to the relative 
position of economies in international markets as a factor in determining the economic 
gains from climate investments. 
Our results confirm that international trade has an important role in the 
distribution of the economic benefits of climate finance. While the largest portion of the 
value-added generated by climate actions is domestic (71% on average), a significant 
share (29% on average) spills over to other economies. Spill-overs accruing to the 
considered donor countries range from 10% to 28%, depending on the climate actions 
implemented and the location. 
The magnitude of the spill-overs varies with the nature of the project. 
Deployment of renewable energy technologies generates large spill-over effects, while 
M&A actions produce substantial domestic impact and limited spill-overs. The type of 
actions that offer recipient countries the best opportunities to grow do not coincide with 
those that benefit donor countries in the form of spill-overs. Nevertheless, there are 
some mitigation and adaptation options that involve substantial benefits in terms of 
value-added in both donor and recipient countries (i.e. renewable energy sources like 
CSP and offshore wind, infrastructures for transport and adaptation, and water supply 
and management projects). 
While renewable energy deployment is the type of intervention with better 
return in terms of spill-overs for all donors, some differences have been identified. The 
USA benefits from substantial spill-overs from any type of climate project that is 
implemented in Mexico. Largest spill-overs to the EU come from renewable energy 
projects implemented in China and Mexico. ODC benefit similarly from renewable 
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energy investments in China, Mexico and Indonesia, while EA benefits especially from 
renewable energy in Indonesia.  
Several climate actions have been identified that might be unlikely to find 
funding opportunities if donors made their decisions exclusively based on the prospects 
of capturing value-added impacts. This is the case of coastal protection in Indonesia, 
where two million people are exposed to rising sea level rise (IPCC, 2001). In these 
specific situations the international community should implement mechanisms to ensure 
that sufficient climate financial flows reach the most vulnerable regions. 
Even though the main purpose of climate finance is enabling climate action in 
recipient countries, the study of the economic impact of climate finance disbursements 
provides useful insights on how country-driven climate strategies may make a major 
contribution not only to low carbon development and climate change adaptation, but 
also to overall economic development. The current analysis has therefore focused on the 
opportunities of the transition towards decarbonised and resilient societies although, in 
future developments, it could be used to complement this assessment of economic 
benefits with the estimation of mitigation potential of financed climate actions. 
Taking into account that the long-term finance commitments of higher-income 
countries under the United Nations’ Climate talks entail reaching USD 100 billion per 
year by 202010, spill-over effects may add up to several billion USD per year. Thus, our 
results constitute valuable information for governments to help them understand the 
economic consequences of decisions about climate finance allocation. For example, our 
results suggest that correcting the current bias towards mitigation in climate finance 
flows would not only enhance developing countries’ climate resilience, but also 
contribute to their economic growth. 
Finally, our findings may help aligning mitigation and adaptation to climate 
change with industrial policy. Thus, our results suggest that some recipient countries 
have significant room for manoeuvre for improving their ability to retain the value-
added generated by capital-intensive projects, such as those involving renewable energy 
technologies. Such projects require machinery, transportation and communication 
equipment, and mineral and metal inputs that must typically be brought from abroad. 
Thus, in order to maximise the domestic impact of climate finance, recipient countries 
Page 18 of 42
URL: https://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/cdev  Email: TCLD-peerreview@journals.tandf.co.uk
Submission to Climate and Development
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Review Only
could pursue strategies aimed at improving the competitiveness of their industrial 
sectors. Technology transfer programmes may also enhance the ability of these 
countries to decrease their dependency on imports of capital goods that generate 
relevant spill-overs. As long as such programmes help to build up competitive industries 
that can provide substitutes for the imported goods, the domestic impact of climate 
finance may multiply.  
Notes 
[1] Accounting for the current pledges according to the web site Climate Funds Update 
(2016). 
[2] For example, Timmer et al. (2014) using the GMRIO framework show that the 
process of international production fragmentation is pervasive: between 1995 and 2008 
the content of foreign value-added in manufactures increased in 85% of the examined 
goods. 
[3] In the WIOD and in this paper UK is still considered a Member State of the 
European Union. 
[4] For a detailed description of the WIOD project, the WIOT and main weaknesses see 
Dietzenbacher, Los, Stehrer, Timmer, & de Vries (2013), Timmer et al. (2012) and 
Timmer, Dietzenbacher, Los, Stehrer, & de Vries (2015). 
[5] Table A.1. in the Appendix displays the NACE classification of commodities. 
NACE stands for Nomenclature statistique des activités économiques dans la 
Communauté européenne 
[6] Since this information is not available for two recipient countries (China and 
Indonesia), average values of the other recipient countries (Brazil, India and Mexico) 
are used instead. 
[7] Figures for recipient countries (columns 1-5) reflect the percentage of impact that is 
retained by each country when it receives climate finance. Figures for donor countries 
(columns 7-10) reflect the percentage of impact that each donor country attracts on 
average when climate finance is disbursed to the recipient countries considered. The 
colour scale reflects the attractiveness of each climate action for each country (from the 
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point of view of its potential for creating domestic impacts in the case of recipient 
countries, and spill-overs in the case of donors). So, the colour scale ranks values 
column-wise. The most attractive options are in darker tones and the least attractive 
ones in lighter tones. The table is sorted by the value of column 6 (Average Recipient) 
in descending order. 
[8] The colour scale reflects the attractiveness of each climate action for each donor 
country (from the point of view of its potential for creating spill-overs). So, the colour 
scale ranks the values referred to one donor (including different climate actions in 
different locations). The most attractive options are in darker tones and the least 
attractive ones in lighter tones. 
[9] Six European countries, the USA and Japan were in the top-ten global 
competitiveness ranking 2011-2012. China occupies the highest position amongst the 
BRICS, and Mexico is in 58st place out of 144 in the global ranking (Schwab, 2011). 
[10] This amount is similar to the level of total net official development assistance and 
official aid received in 2005: 108.45 USD billions (The World Bank, 2016). 
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Appendix 
Table A.1. NACE classification of commodities 
Code Description 
1 Products of agriculture, hunting and related services 
2 Products of forestry, logging and related services 
5 Fish and other fishing products; services incidental of fishing 
10 Coal and lignite; peat 
11 Crude petroleum and natural gas; services incidental to oil and gas extraction excluding surveying 
12 Uranium and thorium ores 
13 Metal ores 
14 Other mining and quarrying products 
15 Food products and beverages 
16 Tobacco products 
17 Textiles 
18 Wearing apparel; furs 
19 Leather and leather products 
20 Wood and products of wood and cork (except furniture); articles of straw and plaiting materials 
21 Pulp, paper and paper products 
22 Printed matter and recorded media 
23 Coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuels 
24 Chemicals, chemical products and man-made fibres 
25 Rubber and plastic products 
26 Other non-metallic mineral products 
27 Basic metals 
28 Fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment 
29 Machinery and equipment not elsewhere classified (n.e.c.) 
30 Office machinery and computers 
31 Electrical machinery and apparatus n.e.c. 
32 Radio, television and communication equipment and apparatus 
33 Medical, precision and optical instruments, watches and clocks 
34 Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 
35 Other transport equipment 
36 Furniture; other manufactured goods n.e.c. 
37 Secondary raw materials 
40 Electrical energy, gas, steam and hot water 
41 Collected and purified water, distribution services of water 
45 Construction work 
50 Trade, maintenance and repair services of motor vehicles and motorcycles; retail sale of automotive fuel 
51 Wholesale trade and commission trade services, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles 
52 Retail trade services, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles; repair services of personal and household 
goods 
55 Hotel and restaurant services 
60 Land transport; transport via pipeline services 
61 Water transport services 
62 Air transport services 
63 Supporting and auxiliary transport services; travel agency services 
64 Post and telecommunication services 
65 Financial intermediation services, except insurance and pension funding services 
66 Insurance and pension funding services, except compulsory social security services 
67 Services auxiliary to financial intermediation 
70 Real estate services 
71 Renting services of machinery and equipment without operator and of personal and household goods 
72 Computer and related services 
73 Research and development services 
74 Other business services 
75 Public administration and defence services; compulsory social security services 
80 Education services 
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85 Health and social work services 
90 Sewage and refuse disposal services, sanitation and similar services 
91 Membership organisation services n.e.c. 
92 Recreational, cultural and sporting services 
93 Other services 
95 Private households with employed persons 
 
Structure of the multiregional IO model 
The structure of a multiregional IO model is illustrated with the example of a three-
country model. It consists of a system of linear equations that describe the relation 
between inputs and final products in each sector. In this case, the standard demand-
driven model can be written as ( ) 1-x I A F LF−= =  
With 
1
2
3
x
x x
x
 
 
= 
 
 
, 
1 0 0
0 1 0
0 0 1
I
 
 =  
 
 
, 
11 12 13
21 22 23
31 32 33
A A A
A A A A
A A A
 
 
=  
 
 
, 
11 12 13
21 22 23
31 32 33
f f f
F f f f
f f f
 
 
=  
 
 
 and 
11 12 13
21 22 23
31 32 33
L L L
L L L L
L L L
 
 
= 
 
 
 
Where rx is the column vector of gross outputs in country r with elements 
r
ix  
indicating the production in country r of products of sector i. I is an identity matrix of 
the appropriate dimension (in this case, three). A rs  is the matrix of input coefficients 
calculated as ( ) 1ˆrs rs s −=A Z x , where rsZ is the matrix of intermediate inputs from 
country r to country s, with elements 
rs
ijz indicating the sales of sector i in country r to 
sector j in country s and ( )-1ˆ rx is the inverse of the diagonal matrix of the gross outputs 
vector. ( ) 1- −I A is also known as the matrix of production multipliers or Leontief inverse 
matrix L , where each element 
rs
ijl indicates the increase in the production of sector i in 
country r due to a unitary increase of demand of sector j in country s. f
st
 is the column 
vector with the final demand, with elements 
st
jf  indicating the final demand in country 
t for products of sector j produced by country s. This model is called demand-driven 
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because for any new exogenous final demand 'F , the total output 'x can be estimated as 
' '=x LF .  
Value-added reflects the contribution of an industry to an economy (Miller & Blair, 
2009). Using value-added coefficients it is possible to differentiate the contribution of 
each country to the value-added embodied in a certain new expenditure (Dietzenbacher, 
Guilhoto, & Imori, 2013). To calculate value-added coefficients the row vector of 
value-added in country r wr, with elements 
r
iw  indicating the value-added created in 
each sector i of that country, is used. With this information and the inverse of the 
diagonal matrix of the gross outputs, value-added coefficients are obtained as 
( )-1ˆ=r r rv x w . The vector of value-added effects is calculated as ˆ ˆ' '= =w vx vLF . Thus, 
the value-added created in the country r as a consequence of a demand shock in country 
t is 
'w '=∑ v L frt r rs st
s
. 
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Table 1. Types of adaptation projects and sources of information 
Climate action Type of intervention NAPA Project 
A
d
ap
ta
ti
o
n
 
Coastal 
protection 
Beach nourishment GAMBIA #9 
Coastal protection structures CAPE VERDE #3 
Rehabilitation of coastal areas SIERRE LEONE #18 
Disaster risk 
reduction 
Early warning or emergency response systems GAMBIA #1 
Construction or improvement of drainage systems BHUTAN #5 
Flood protection BHUTAN #7 
Hazard mapping and monitoring technologies BHUTAN #9 
Improved climate services SIERRE LEONE #2 
Water supply 
and 
management 
Rainwater harvesting and storage SUDAN #2 
Rehabilitation of water distribution networks SIERRE LEONE #12 
Desalinization, water recycling and water conservation TUVALU #3 
Human 
settlements, 
infrastructure 
and spatial 
planning 
Energy security (hydropower) TANZANIA #5 
Energy security (solar energy) SIERRE LEONE #8 
Energy security (biomass) GAMBIA #6 
Transport and road infrastructure adaptation MALDIVES #10 
Protection of infrastructure BHUTAN #6 
Zoning SAMOA #6 
Improving the resilience of existing infrastructures/buildings MALDIVES #8 
Social 
protection 
Livelihood diversification MALAWI #1 
Food storage and preservation facilities LESOTHO #8 
Health, vaccination programmes SIERRE LEONE #23 
Waste and 
wastewater 
Sanitation SIERRE LEONE #22 
Storm and wastewater MALDIVES #5 
M
it
ig
at
io
n
 &
 a
d
ap
ta
ti
o
n
 
Forestry and 
land use, 
Terrestrial 
Ecosystems 
Afforestation and reforestation ERITREA #3 
Ecological restoration and soil conservation LESOTHO #6 
Protection of biodiversity TUVALU #5 
Forest management, management of slopes and basins BURUNDI #3 
Forest fires reduction BHUTAN #11 
Capacity 
building 
Awareness raising and integrating into education BURUNDI #11 
Technical assistance MALAWI #5 
Planning, policy development and implementation SIERRE LEONE #19 
Agriculture, 
fishing and 
livestock 
Crop / animal diversification SIERRE LEONE #5 
Crop, grazing land, livestock and fisheries enhanced management ERITREA #2 
Research MALDIVES #9 
Irrigation and drainage system SIERRE LEONE #7 
Source: Own work. 
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Table 2. Correspondence between NAPA categories and NACE codes 
NAPA expenditure categories NACE code 
Breeding animals, forage seeds, planting, crop management 1 
Forest nurseries, re/afforestation, rehabilitation, beach stabilization, plantations 2 
Materials, reporting, communication, awareness creation, training 22 
Chemicals, drugs, raw materials 24 
Materials for construction and rehabilitation 26 
Tools 28 
Machinery and installation 29 
Office equipment  30 
Transmission and distribution network 31 
Laboratory/field/data processing eq., hydro/meteorology stations, telecom., remote sensing 33 
Vehicles 34 
Construction, rehabilitation, beach stabilisation, improve facilities/infrastructure 45 
Logistics 60 
Communication (campaign, networks, workshops) 63 
Communication (telephone, internet and postal charges) 64 
Micro-credit fund 65 
Vehicle hiring charges 71 
Research, experimentation, mapping 73 
Technical support, design, management, planning, training 74 
Institutionalisation of policies, support to collaborating agencies 75 
Sanitary inspections, vector control measures, medical/veterinary services 85 
Waste collection, sanitation 90 
Source: Own work. NACE classification is reported in Supplementary Material. 
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Table 3. Portion of impact captured by each country by climate action (%) 
Column number (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
 
IND BRA CHN IDN MEX 
AVG 
Recipient 
EU USA EA ODC 
AVG 
Donor 
Coastal (A) 86 88 80 83 82 84 4 3 2 1 2 
B_insulation (EE) 82 89 81 81 83 83 3 3 2 2 2 
Forest (M&A) 87 87 80 79 78 82 4 4 2 1 3 
Capacity (M&A) 86 87 78 78 76 81 5 4 2 1 3 
T_RE (RE) 89 84 83 77 68 80 4 4 2 1 3 
Social P (A) 84 85 73 75 74 79 6 4 2 1 3 
Agriculture (M&A) 85 84 78 76 74 79 5 4 2 1 3 
Waste (A) 81 84 77 72 72 77 6 4 3 2 4 
Geo_deep (RE) 81 83 76 67 71 76 5 4 3 2 4 
Biomass_big (RE) 80 80 74 66 63 73 6 5 4 2 4 
CSP (RE) 83 77 72 70 60 72 6 5 5 2 4 
Water (A) 75 78 73 65 62 71 8 5 3 2 5 
Infrastr (A) 80 78 70 65 60 70 8 5 4 2 5 
Wind_off (RE) 81 77 71 65 57 70 7 6 4 3 5 
T_infrastr (EE) 79 74 70 70 53 69 8 6 4 2 5 
Biogas (RE) 80 76 71 58 57 68 7 6 4 2 5 
Industry (EE) 79 76 72 60 53 68 8 6 4 2 5 
DRR (A) 78 76 67 63 55 68 8 6 4 2 5 
Biomass_small (RE) 75 77 68 56 59 67 7 5 5 3 5 
Solar_PV (RE) 73 75 65 67 55 67 6 5 5 2 5 
Hydro (RE) 80 71 68 54 44 63 9 7 5 2 6 
Wind_on (RE) 79 71 65 57 45 63 8 7 5 3 6 
Geo_surface (RE) 77 74 68 50 47 63 9 7 5 3 6 
B_RE (RE) 79 69 68 57 42 63 9 7 6 2 6 
Solar_thermal (RE) 70 73 66 54 52 63 9 6 5 3 6 
Ocean (RE) 68 68 65 44 39 57 11 8 6 3 7 
Average M&A 86 86 79 78 76 81 5 4 2 1 3 
Average A 80 81 73 70 66 75 7 5 3 2 4 
Average EE 82 81 77 72 64 73 6 5 3 2 4 
Average RE 77 75 69 59 53 68 8 6 5 2 5 
 
Source: Own work. Abbreviations: BRA (Brazil), CHN (China), EA (East Asia), EU (European Union),  
IDN (Indonesia), IND (India), MEX (Mexico), ODC (other developed countries), USA (United States of 
America), AVG (average), A (adaptation), Agriculture (agriculture, fishing and livestock), B_insulation 
(building insulation), B_RE (renewable energy in buildings), Biogas (biogas power), Biomass_big 
(biomass energy large scale), Biomass_small (biomass energy small scale), Capacity (capacity building),  
Coastal (coastal protection), CSP (concentrated solar power), DRR (disaster risk reduction), Forest 
(forestry and land use/ terrestrial ecosystems), EE (energy efficiency), Geo_deep (deep geothermal 
energy), Geo_surface (surface geothermal power), Hydro (hydropower), Industry (energy efficiency in 
industry), Infrastr (human settlements, infrastructure and spatial planning), M&A (mitigation and 
adaptation), ocean (ocean power), RE (renewable energy), Social P. (social protection), Solar PV 
(photovoltaics), Solar_thermal (solar thermal energy), T_infrastr (infrastructures for transport), T_RE 
(renewable energy in transport, biofuels), Waste (waste and wastewater), Water (water supply and 
management), Wind_off (offshore wind power), Wind_on (onshore wind power).  
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Table 4. Impact captured by donor country, location and climate action (%) 
USA EU EA ODC 
AVG 
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R
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E
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B
R
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C
H
N
 
ID
N
 
M
E
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Ocean 3 5 3 5 24 7 11 13 12 13 2 3 6 11 6 2 2 4 4 4 7 
Geo_surface 2 4 3 4 22 5 9 11 10 11 2 2 6 11 5 2 2 4 3 3 6 
B_RE 2 4 3 4 22 4 10 11 9 11 2 4 7 9 7 1 1 3 3 3 6 
Hydro 2 4 3 4 21 4 9 11 9 11 2 3 7 9 6 1 1 3 3 3 6 
Wind_on 2 5 4 4 19 4 9 11 7 10 2 3 7 9 6 2 2 4 3 4 6 
Solar_thermal 2 4 3 4 18 6 9 12 9 10 2 2 6 9 5 2 2 4 3 3 6 
Industry 2 3 3 3 19 4 9 9 8 9 2 2 5 8 5 2 1 3 3 3 5 
T_infrastr 2 4 3 2 21 4 10 11 5 8 2 3 5 6 7 2 1 3 2 3 5 
DRR 3 4 4 3 15 5 9 11 8 8 2 2 7 6 5 1 1 3 2 2 5 
Biomass_small 2 3 3 3 15 5 7 10 7 7 2 2 5 10 4 2 2 5 3 3 5 
Biogas 2 3 3 3 17 4 8 10 8 8 2 2 5 8 5 1 1 3 3 2 5 
Infrastr 2 3 3 3 15 4 8 10 8 8 1 2 6 6 4 2 1 3 2 2 5 
Wind_off 2 4 3 3 16 4 8 9 5 8 2 2 5 7 4 2 2 4 2 3 5 
Solar_PV 2 3 4 2 14 5 6 10 5 6 2 3 7 6 6 2 2 4 2 2 5 
Water 2 3 3 3 16 5 8 10 8 8 2 1 4 6 3 2 1 2 2 2 5 
Biomass_big 2 3 3 2 14 4 7 7 6 7 1 2 5 7 4 2 1 3 2 2 4 
CSP 2 3 3 2 14 3 7 8 4 6 1 3 6 6 6 1 1 3 2 2 4 
Waste 2 2 3 2 12 4 6 7 6 6 1 1 4 5 2 2 1 3 2 2 4 
Geo_deep 2 2 3 2 12 3 6 7 5 5 1 1 4 6 3 2 1 3 2 2 4 
Social P 2 2 4 2 11 3 6 9 5 6 1 1 4 4 2 1 1 2 2 1 3 
Agriculture 2 2 3 2 11 3 6 7 5 5 1 1 4 4 2 1 1 2 2 2 3 
Capacity 2 2 4 2 12 3 5 7 4 5 1 1 3 4 2 1 1 2 2 1 3 
T_RE 1 2 2 2 15 2 5 5 4 5 1 1 2 4 2 1 1 2 2 2 3 
Forest 2 2 3 2 10 2 4 6 4 4 1 1 3 4 2 1 1 2 2 1 3 
Coastal 1 2 2 1 7 3 5 5 3 3 1 1 4 2 2 1 1 2 1 1 2 
B_insulation 1 1 2 1 7 3 4 4 3 3 1 1 3 3 2 2 1 3 2 1 2 
 
Source: Own work. Abbreviations: BRA (Brazil), CHN (China), EA (East Asia), EU (European Union), 
IDN (Indonesia), IND (India), MEX (Mexico), ODC (other developed countries), USA (United States of 
America), AVG (average), Agriculture (agriculture, fishing and livestock), B_insulation (insulation of 
buildings), B_RE (renewable energy in buildings), Capacity B. (capacity building), Coastal (coastal 
protection), CSP (concentrated solar power), DRR (disaster risk reduction), Forestry (forestry and land 
use/ Terrestrial Ecosystems), Geo_deep (geothermal deep), Geo_surface (geothermal surface), Hydro 
(hydropower), Infrastr (human settlements), infrastructure and spatial planning), Ocean (ocean power), 
Social P. (social protection), Solar PV (photovoltaics), T_infrastr (transport infrastructure), T_RE 
(renewable energy in transport), Waste (waste and wastewater), Water (water supply and management), 
Wind_off (offshore wind), Wind_on (onshore wind). 
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Figure 1. Cost structure per climate action.  
Source: Lehr et al. (2012, 2008), Allan et al. (2008), Markaki et al.(2013), and UNFCCC (2014b). The 
description of commodity codes of the NACE classification is detailed in Table A.1. of the Appendix.  
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Figure 2. Geographic distribution of the impact by recipient country.  
Source: Own work. Abbreviations: BRA (Brazil), CHN (China), EA (East Asia), EU (European Union), IDN 
(Indonesia), IND (India), MEX (Mexico), ODC (other developed countries), USA (United States of America).  
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Figure 3. Example of financial flows from donors to recipients.  
Source: Own work. Abbreviations: BRA (Brazil), CHN (China), EA (East Asia), EU (European Union), GCF 
(Green Climate Fund), IDN (Indonesia), IND (India),  
MEX (Mexico), ODC (other developed countries), USA (United States of America), ROW (rest of the world).  
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Figure 4. Distribution of the impact of a hypothetical climate fund.  
Source: Own work. Abbreviations: BRA (Brazil), CHN (China), EA (East Asia), EU (European Union), GCF 
(Green Climate Fund), IDN (Indonesia), IND (India), MEX (Mexico), ODC (other developed countries), USA 
(United States of America), ROW (rest of the world).  
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Figure 5. Average spill-overs by type of climate action.  
Source: Own work. Abbreviations: Agriculture (agriculture, fishing and livestock), B_insulation (building 
insulation), B_RE (renewable energy in buildings), Biogas (biogas power), Biomass_big (biomass energy 
large scale), Biomass_small (biomass energy small scale), Capacity (capacity building), Coastal (coastal 
protection), CSP (concentrated solar power), DRR (disaster risk reduction), Forest (forestry and land use/ 
terrestrial ecosystems), Geo_deep (deep geothermal energy), Geo_surface (surface geothermal power), 
Hydro (hydropower), Industry (energy efficiency in industry), Infrastr (human settlements, infrastructure 
and spatial planning), Ocean (ocean power), Social P. (social protection), Solar PV (photovoltaics), 
Solar_thermal (solar thermal energy), T_infrastr (infrastructures for transport), T_RE (renewable energy in 
transport, biofuels), Waste (waste and wastewater), Water (water supply and management), Wind_off 
(offshore wind power), Wind_on (onshore wind power).  
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